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Risk Balancing Using Farm Level Data:  An Econome tric Analysis 
 
Abstract: 
In the paper, an econometric model is proposed to test the risk balancing hypothesis 
using farm level data. For the purpose, a constraint on expected utility maximization with 
respect to farm financial structure is given. Cluster method is applied to pick out the farms on 
the efficient frontier under expected utility maximization given risk attitude and actual 
interest rate. Regression results are given and compared to previous findings. Farm 
characteristics associated with the risk behaviors of farms with optimal utility are identified 
and compared with other farms.  
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Risk Balancing Using Farm Level Data:  An Econometric Analysis 
 
Under the framework of expected utility maximization, risk balancing hypothesis states that 
change in business risk might produce opposite movement in financial risk (Barry and 
Robinson, Collins, Gabriel and Baker). Generally, business risk is measured as the volatility 
of rate of return on farm asset while financial risk refers to debt to equity ratio. Past studies 
on risk balancing have shown that risk balancing might lead to failure of government policy 
in reducing farm risk (Featherstone, et al), and change in risk attitude or interest rate would 
lead to different adjustment in financial structure (Barry and Robison).  
Recent studies focused on the effects of risk management strategies on farmers’ risk 
balancing behaviors. For example, Escalante and Barry (2001) employed a risk programming 
model to illustrate risk balancing behavior of a typical farm. Their study showed that the 
greater appeal of the risk benefits on diversity in farm risk management might downplay the 
role of risk balancing, which implies that risk balancing is conditional in practice. By 
studying the correlation coefficient between business and financial risks in a longitudinal 
farm level data, Escalante and Barry (2003) found that over 50% out of 82 farms in the study 
had risk balancing behavior. The following analysis based on two periods cross-sectional data 
showed that the coefficients react significantly to crop insurance coverage, tenure position, 
and crop diversification index in the late 1990s.  
In the study, we investigate the implication of the expected utility maximization with 
respect to farm financial structure, so as to put the empirical analysis under the framework of 
optimal utility. An econometric model is then proposed to test the risk balancing hypothesis 
directly with farm level data. Based on the regression results, farm characteristics associated 
with the risk balancing behavior are identified.   
    3 
Model 
The equilibrium analysis approach assumes that individual farm maximize expected utility of 
wealth. Under the mean -variance framework (Barry and Robison, Collins), the objective 
function can be expressed as: 
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E s  are mean and variance of rate of return on equity,  r  is the risk 
aversion parameter. 
Collins (1985) showed that if we write return on equity as a function of debt to 
equity ratio  d , expected rate of return on asset  r and its variance  2
r s , and interest rate  i, that 
is  
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the maximization problem becomes 
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Solving the problem with respect to  d gives  
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The second-order condition is met by risk-averse proprietors.  
Equation (4) captures the relationship between business risk  2
r s and financial risk 
d under the framework of expected utility maximization. In equilibrium, risk balancing 
implies 













                                 
when   i r -  is greater than zero, and given the definition of  2
r s  and  d  .    4 
Optimal utility level of a farm is required for equation (5), i.e. risk balancing to be 
held. Past empirical studies generally either assume that the results, derived from the 
aggregate data, would describe the behavior of “aggregate decision makers” if hard to obtain 
adequate farm level data (Gabriel and Baker), or apply risk programming model to a 
representative farm under different level of risk aversion parameters (Escalante and Barry 
2001) to obtain the level.  
In this study, however, we assume that, in practice, some of farms are optimally 
operated while others are not, and thus there is an efficient frontier of optimal utility formed 
by those optimally operated farms. The expected utility maximization model of equation (3) 











 is m, a constraint utility maximization problem based on equation (3) could be 
constructed as 
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 Define  i r -  as the net rate of return, then  m is the maximum net rate of return per 
unit of risk taken. If  r  and  i are given as constant, it can be proved that optimal utility 
level  ) ( * d E satisfying the following inequality 
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Under the condition, value of m determines the optimal utility level for the farm. In 
other words, the underlying efficient frontier is a function of  m. The relationship between 
optimal utility and m is illustrated in Figure 1. For the farms (denoted as * ) on the curve,   5 










 for a given 
farm equals to  m, then from inequality (7), the farm must be on the efficient frontier, and 
thus has the optimal expected utility  * (d EV ). Given this, an efficient frontier could be 





 from the farms with the same value of d  if we 
know the risk aversion parameter  r  and interest rate  i for each farm in the dataset. 
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                   Figure1   Farms on the Efficient Frontier 
 
In practice, interest rate  i , defined as ratio of interest payment to total debt, can be 
calculated using farm level data. As for the risk aversion parameter  r , no direct data is 
available. When programming method is applied, it is usually given as a constant (McCarl 
and Spreen). However, the method would not tell us what exactly the parameter is for the 
underlying farm. On the other hand, inaccurate estimate of the parameter might lead to 
overestimate or underestimate of the optimal utility level for a given farm (Appendix B).  
Consider this, we assume that risk aversion of a farm is a function of some variables 
available from the data. In the study, two variables are assumed to affect farmer’s risk 
attitude, ratio of variance of rate of return on asset to insurance expense per acre tillable land 
(RVI), and Tenure. RVI gives the risk taken by per unit of insurance expense on per acre   6 
tillable land. Generally, given the risk level, the higher insurance expense per unit land, the 
more risk aversion the farmer is, and vise verse. Tenure position distinguishes landowner 
from manager. Theoretically, landowner is more risk aversion than manager in farm 
operation. 
Farms with similar  r  and  i are then grouped together by cluster method based on 
RVI, tenure and  i. Moreover, for comparison with similar research, farm size is also 
included in the variables, and is defined as ratio of farm tillable acres to total tillable acres in 
the dataset (Size).   
 Of farms with similar  r  and  i, farms on the efficient frontier could be formed by 





 among those with the same or similar debt to equity 
ratio d  (Figure 1).  For the reason, cluster method is applied again to the partitioned groups 
obtained above respectively, and some subgroups will be produced based on the value of 





 within each subgroup are 
picked out as those on the efficient frontier.  
Since risk balancing is an equilibrium result under the definition of equation (4), it 
should occur among the farms on the efficient frontier rather than out of it. From equation 
(4), we have
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r . Using first order Taylor series approximation,  2
r s  can be 
expressed as a linear regression model of  d   and    i r -  around the optimal values, which is  
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where r r , 2 s ,  iand  d are defined the same as above.    7 
Applying the model to the farms on the efficient frontier provide an equilibrium 
testing of the hypothesis. The estimated coefficients  1 b  and  2 b are the marginal contributes 
of the independent variables to  2
r s respectively. Risk balancing implies estimated coefficient 
2 b should be negative.  
 
Empirical Analysis   
Farm level data from IFBFM (Illinois Farm Business Farm Management) during the period 
of 1996 to 2002 are used in the study. The farms should be in the dataset for at least four 
years during the period, and total 1964 farms are included. Table1 gives the summary 
statistics of the data. 
These farms are partitioned into four groups based on four variables defined above, 
including ratio of variance of rate of return on asset to insurance expense per acre tillable 
land (RVI), ratio of farm interest payment to total debt ( i), Tenure, and ratio of farm tillable 
acres to total tillable acres (Size). A nonhierarchical clustering technique Kmeans from Stata 
is applied. The method b reaks the farms into distinct non-overlapping groups based on the 
selected variables. As a result, values of the selected variables within each partitioned group 
are similar, but different among the groups. The four partitioned groups consist of 268, 
463,689 and 544 farms respectively.  
On the basis, Kmeans method by debt to equity ratio  d  is applied again to pick out 
farms on the efficient frontier within each partitioned group. In the process, the average 
distance of d for each subgroup is controlled to be 1%, 3%, 5% and 8% respectively. The 
average distance is defined as mean of the difference of maximum and minimum values of 
d  divided by the minimum value of d within each subgroup. Table 2 illustrates the   8 
percentile of farms on the efficient frontier within each partitioned group. On average, 
around 25% of the farms within each group are on the efficient frontier. 
The regression model is then applied to the cross sectional of data from the farms on 
the efficient frontier within each group respectively. The results are listed in Table 3. For 
comparison, regression results without considering efficient frontier are given in Table 4.  
From Table 3, of the farms on the efficient frontier, farms in the fourth group 
demonstrate consistently strong risk balancing behavior, while those in the third group have 
no such behavior. Compared to farms in the fourth group, those in the second group have 
relatively weak risk balancing behavior. As the average distance of d  increase, the behavior 
is less obvious. Behavior of farms in the first group is uncertain, and it seems that other 
factors might affect the dependent variable other than the debt to equity ration d . Moreover, 
the contradictory results of the third group in Table 3 and Table 4 proved the value of 
considering efficient frontier.  Overall, farms demonstrated risk balancing behaviors are 
around 43% of the average 471 farms on the efficient frontier. The percentage is close to the 
finding of Escalante and Barry (2003).  
Table 5 provides the summary statistics for the farms on the efficient frontier for the 
3% case
(1). Comparing the result reveals some interesting farm characteristics for the 
underlying farms, especially those with risk bal ancing behavior. For example, the fourth 
group that illustrates consistent risk behavior consists of relatively younger farmers with the 
lowest average age (46) and smallest farm size (0.0503%). These farms mainly operate on 
the leasing land and depend on external fund. As a result, they have the lowest tenure 
position (0.25%) and highest debt to equity ratio (1.13).  These farms also have the highest 
RVI (0.96%). Together with the lowest tenure position, we could say that these farms are 
relatively less risk aversion. Their net rate of return measured as  i r -  is also the highest.     9 
By contrast, the second group consists of farmers of moderate age (49). They have a 
medium tenure position (16.6%), but the largest farm size (6.07%). These farms do not 
borrow much with an average debt to equity level (0.76). Values of the interest rate paid 
(6.17%), RVI (0.60%), and  i r -  (20%) for the group are all at a moderate level.  
The third group consists of mainly old farmers who operate largely on owned land. 
Their average age is 54. On average, they own 46.6 percent of land, but land quality is the 
lowest one, an average soil rating of 77. Moreover, these farms have the lowest debt level 
(0.49) and thus lowest interest rate paid (4.8%). RVI value is also the lowest (0.56%). As a 
result, farmers in this group are highly risk aversion. The lowest net rate of return (17.5%) 
could be another proof. 
Farm characteristics for the first group are a little confusing. Although their debt to 
equity level is not the highest (0.84), they paid the highest interest rate on average (6.4%).  
These farms also lease most of their land as those in the fourth group, while their farm size 
is somewhat closer to that of group 2.  
In summary, younger leasing farmer is more prone to take risk and thus obtain a 
relatively higher rate of return. Older farmers are more risk aversion, and own considerable 
share of land. Moreover, most of farms are clustered either in the third or in the fourth 
groups. There are 1333 farms belong to the two groups, taking up nearly 70% of the total 
farms in the data set. 
 
Summary and Discussion 
In the paper, an econometric model is proposed to test the risk balancing hypothesis using 
farm level data. Under the expected utility mean variance framework, a constrained utility 
maximization is proposed to construct the efficient frontier under the optimal utility. Cluster 
method is applied to pick out the farms on the efficient frontier under expected utility   10 
maximization given risk attitude and actual interest rate. For the farms on the efficient 
frontier, an econometric model is used to test the hypothesis.  
Two important implications are obtained from the results. First, even with farm level 
data, risk balancing is showed to be conditional. On average, around 43% of the average 471 
farms on the efficient frontier demonstrated risk behaviors. The results support strongly the 
finding of Escalante and Barry (2003). Second, farm characteristics affect the risk balancing 
behaviors. Generally, farms with lower risk averse and relatively higher return tend to 
demonstrate risk balancing behaviors. They usually have higher debt level.  
The econometric model is on the assumption that  2
r s is a homogenous function of 
degree 1 of  i r -  and d , that is, variable  i r - is independent of d  (Modigliani and Miller 
Proposition, Collins) given  r  and  i. The assumption of independence might be violated in 
practice and lead to bias of estimates for d . For example, for the case of 3% average 
distance of d , a simple regression of  i r -  on d  for the third group reveals a significantly 
positive coefficient for  d . For the regression adjusted R2 is only 6%, the bias is not 
considered in the study. 
Theoretically, risk aversion parameters  r  reflect the magnitude of risk aversion. 
The classification applied gives an approximate measurement of the parameter. Although 
the results could be rough, it is still an effective approach in maintaining similarity of the 
parameters within each group. In addition, the varied average distances of debt to equity 
ratiod within the partitioned groups are applied to differentiate farms on the efficient 
frontier. According to inequality (7), too fine a classification might overestimate the frontier, 
and vise versa. The problem might be solved by further considering confidence level in 
clustering.    11 
Note  
(1) Summary statistics for the case of 1%, 5% and 8% are similar to that of the 3% case. The 
Tables for the other three cases are available from the authors upon request.  12 
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Appendix A 
For the constrained maximization problem, 
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If we substitute the optimal debt to equity ratio  * d  back in equation (2), the optimal utility 
level  be 
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Appendix B 
From inequality (5), suppose a farmer has a risk aversion parameter  1 r  and a constant  i and 
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Suppose it holds in equality for the farm.  Now, if we take the farmer’s risk attitude as  2 r , 
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Similarly, if  1 2 r r > , we will underestimate the farm’s optimal utility level. 
   
 
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics of Selected Variables of the Total Farm Data   
Variable  Definition  Farms   Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Tenure  Ratio of owned land acres to tillable acres (%)  1964  21.66   24.69   0.00   100.00  
RVI 
Ratio of variance of rate of return on asset to insurance 
expense per acre tillable land (%)  1964  0.96   2.18   0.01   71. 63  
Size  Ratio of farm tillable acres to total tillable acres (%)  1964  0.05   0.03   0.00   0.31  
i    Ratio of farm interest payment to total debt (%)  1964  5.66   2.64   -0.10   76.74  
Cropshare  Ratio of crop sale to total gross farm return  1964  0.93   0.12   0.03   1.14  
Soil Rating  Soil rating index  1964  80   12   44   100  
Age  Age  1850  51   11   6   84  
d     Debt to Equity Ratio  1964  0.69   0.94   0.00   12.96  
i r -    
Rate of return on assets minus interest payment to total 
debt (%) 
1964  19.48   23.68   -62.54   433.22  
2





Table 2 Farms on the Efficient Frontier  
Average Distance 
of   Group 
1  2  3  4 
 
 
Farms in Each Group  268  463  689  544 
Farms  110   180   250   205  
1% 
Percentage  41%  39%  36%  38% 
 Farms  65  115  170  135 
3% 
Percentage  24%  25%  25%  25% 
Farms  58   76   130   110  
5% 
Percentage  22%  16%  19%  20% 
Farms  52   60   95   71  
8% 
Percentage  19%  13%  14%  13% 
Percentage is calculated as farms on efficient frontier within each group to the number 
of farms in the same group 
 
 
dTable 3 Regression Results for the Farms on the Efficient Frontier within Each Group with 
Average Distance of 1%, 3%, 5% and 8% respectively 
(a) 
Results for Average Distance of  d   = 1% 
1  2  3  4               Group                                 
Variables  Estimates t-ratio  Estimates t-ratio  Estimates t-ratio Estimates  t-ratio 
 d          0.00021   0.56  -0.0013  -2.2**  0.0012   1.03  -0.0014  -1.72*** 
         i r -   0.01678   4.63*  0.0706   32.46*  0.0807  27.05*  0.0905   12.28* 
Constant  -0.00004  -0.04  -0.0086  -11.18* -0.0096  -8.28*  -0.0173   -6.67* 
Adjusted R
2  0.15   0.86   0.76   0.42  
Farms  110   180   250   205  
Results for Average Distance of d    = 3% 
1  2  3  4               Group                                 
Variables  Estimates t-ratio  Estimates t-ratio  Estimates t-ratio Estimates  t-ratio 
d   -0.00003  -0.07  -0.0017  -2.14** 0.0032   4.46*  -0.0019  -1.88*** 
         i r -   0.00617   1.47  0.0749   30.81*  0.0414  13.65*  0.0977   12.38* 
Constant  0.00159   1.47  -0.0099  -9.58*  -0.0050   5.83*  -0.0205   -6.84* 
Adjusted R 2  0.00   0.89   0.59   0.53  
Farms  65   115   170   135  
Results for Average Distance of  d    = 5% 
1  2  3  4               Group                                 
Variables  Estimates t-ratio  Estimates t-ratio  Estimates t-ratio Estimates  t-ratio 
d          0.00051   2.4*  -0.0004   -1.17  0.0037   4.75*  -0.0018   -1.58 
          i r -    0.00447   1.62  0.0139   5.8*  0.0373   10.8*  0.1017   11.44* 
Constant  0.00093   1.32  -0.0001   -0.17  -0.0051   -4.9*  -0.0221   -6.16* 
Adjusted R
2  0.10   0.30   0.57   0.54  
Farms  58   76   130   110  
Results for Average Distance of  d   = 8% 
1  2  3  4               Group                            
Variables  Estimates t-ratio  Estimates t-ratio  Estimates t-ratio Estimates  t-ratio 
d    -0.00028  -0.89  -0.0004   -1.09  0.0040   4.42*  -0.0035   -2.38* 
         i r -   0.00413   1.46  0.0149   5.88*  0.0386   9.48*  0.1308   14.95* 
Constant  0.00175   2.31*  -0.0003   -0.58  -0.0061  -4.35*  -0.0311   -8.7* 
Adjusted R
2  0.02   0.36   0.59*  0.91  
Farms  52   60   95   71  
Note:(1) Dependent Variable is            
   







Table 4 Regression Results without Considering Efficient Frontier  
(a) 
1  2  3  4                Group                                 
Variables  Estimates  t-ratio  Estimates  t-ratio  Estimates  t-ratio  Estimates  t-ratio   
          d       0.0005   1.27  -0.0015   -3.92*  -0.0224   -2.91*  -0.0111   -4.5*    
        i r -   0.026   7.63*  0.0650   41.86*  0.3721   23.51*  0.3464   21.95*    
Constant  -0.001   -1.01  -0.0057   -13.87*  -0.0268   -4.59*  -0.0716   -12.46*    
Adjusted R2  0.19   0.79   0.45   0.47    
Farms  268  463  689  544   
Percentage  14%  24%  35%  28%   
                           a. Percentage is calculated as farms in each group to total 1964 farms Table 5 Summary Statistics of Selected Variables for Farms on the Efficient Frontier within Each Group (Average Distance of d is 3% ) 
Group 1  Group 3 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Tenure  65  6.72   3.36   1.99   23.17   Tenure  170  45.63   22.87   0.68   100.00  
RVI  65  0.74   0.59   0.08   3.85   RVI  170  0.56   0.82   0.01   6.57  
Size  65  0.059   0.025   0.017   0.118   Size  170  0.053   0.043   0.004   0.271  
  i  65  6.40   2.03   3.13   16.32   i    170  4.85   2.47   0.00   8.92  
Cropshare  65  0.92   0.13   0.33   1.04   Cropshare  170  0.87   0.18   0.20   1.02  
Soil Rating  65  82   13   50   100   Soil Rating  170  78   13   50   100  
Age  58  51   9   37   75   Age  158  54   12   30   84  
  d   65  0.840   0.915   0.006   6.087   d     170  0.49   0.93   0.00   9.02  
i r -     65  21.96   9.51   9.21   62.87   i r -     170  17.47   22.22   -0.74   161.52  
    65  0.29   0.32   0.02   1.83       170  0.38   1.34   0.00   13.90  
Group 2  Group 4 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Tenure  115  16.60   6.71   5.66   47.14   Tenure  135  0.33   1.58   0.00   16.72  
RVI  115  0.60   0.63   0.04   5.09   RVI  135  0.96   1.05   0.10   8.95  
Size  115  0.061   0.017   0.021   0.173   Size  135   0.050   0.026   0.011   0.173  
  i  115  6.17   3.36   1.34   18.86     135  5.69   6.56   0.00   76.74  
Cropshare  115  0.93   0.10   0.37   1.14   Cropshare  135  0.94   0.12   0.32   1.03  
Soil Rating  115  82   11   52   98   Soil Rating  135  83   11   55   100  
Age  110  49   10   26   74   Age  129  46   10   6   74  
d     115  0.76   0.90   0.00   6.25   d     135  1.13   1.68   0.00   12.96  
i r -     115  20.90   28.93   -5.03   302.59   i r -     135  30.30   21.02   -62.54   198.20  
    115  0.45   2.29   0.00   24.49       135  0.70   2.78   0.01   31.44  
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